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As the number of independent countries increases and their economies become more integrated, we
would expect to observe more multi-country currency unions. This paper explores the pros and cons for
diﬀerent countries to adopt as an anchor the dollar, the euro, or the yen. Although there appear to be
reasonably well-deﬁned euro and dollar areas, there does not seem to be a yen area. We also address
the question of how trade and co-movements of outputs and prices would respond to the formation of
a currency union. This response is important because the decision of a country to join a union would
depend on how the union aﬀects trade and co-movements.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Is a country by deﬁnition an optimal currency area? If the optimal number of currencies is less than the
number of existing countries, which countries should form currency areas?
This question, analyzed in the pioneering work of Mundell (1961) and extended in Alesina and Barro
(2002), has jumped to the center stage of the current policy debate for several reasons. First, the large
increase in the number of independent countries in the world led, until recently, to a roughly one-for-one
increase in the number of currencies. This proliferation of currencies occurred despite the growing integration
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1of the world economy. On its own, the growth of international trade in goods and assets should have raised
the transactions beneﬁts from common currencies and led, thereby, to a decline in the number of independent
moneys. Second, the memory of the inﬂationary decades of the seventies and eighties encouraged inﬂation
control, thereby generating consideration of irrevocably ﬁxed exchange rates as a possible instrument to
achieve price stability. Adopting another country’s currency or maintaining a currency board were seen as
more credible commitment devices than a simple ﬁxing of the exchange rate. Third, recent episodes of
ﬁnancial turbulence have promoted discussions about “new ﬁnancial architectures.” Although this dialogue
is often vague and inconclusive, one of its interesting facets is the question of whether the one country/one
currency dogma is still adequate.1
Looking around the world, one sees many examples of movement toward multinational currencies: twelve
countries in Europe have adopted a single currency; dollarization is being implemented in Ecuador and El
Salvador; and dollarization is under active consideration in many other Latin American countries, including
Mexico, Guatemala, and Peru. Six West African states have agreed to create a new common currency for
the region by 2003, and eleven members of the Southern African Development Community are debating
whether to adopt the dollar or to create an independent monetary union possibly anchored to the South
African rand. Six oil-producing countries (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and
Kuwait) have declared their intention to form a currency union by 2010. In addition, several countries have
maintained currency boards with either the U.S. dollar or the euro as the anchor. Currency boards are, in
a sense, mid-way between a system of ﬁxed rates and currency adoption, and the recent adverse experience
of Argentina will likely discourage the use of this mid-way approach.
Currency unions typically take one of two forms. In one, which is most common, client countries (which
are usually small) adopt the currency of a large anchor country. In the other case, a group of countries
creates a new currency and a new joint central bank. The second arrangement applies to the euro zone.2
The Eastern Caribbean Currency Area (ECCA) and the CFA zone in Africa are intermediate between the
two types of unions. In both cases, the countries have a joint currency and a joint central bank.3 However,
1In principle, an optimal currency area could also be smaller that a country, that is, more than one currency could circulate
within a country. However, we have not observed a tendency in this direction.
2Some may argue that the European Monetary Union is, in practice, a German mark area, but this interpretation is
questionable. Although the European central bank may be particularly sensitive to German preferences, the composition of the
board and the observed polices in its ﬁrst few years of existence do not show a German bias. See Alesina et al (2001).
3There are actually two regional central banks in the CFA zone. One is the BCEAO, grouping Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory
Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, where the common currency is the franc de la Communaute Financiere
2the ECCA currency (Caribbean dollar) has been linked since 1976 to the U.S. dollar (and, before that, to
the British pound), and the CFA franc has been tied (except for one devaluation) to the French franc.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether natural currency areas emerge from an empirical
investigation. As a theoretical background, we use the framework developed by Alesina and Barro (2002),
which discusses the trade-oﬀ between the costs and beneﬁts of currency unions. Based on historical patterns
of international trade and of co-movements of prices and outputs, we ﬁnd that there seem to exist reasonably
well-deﬁned dollar and euro areas but no clear yen area. However, a country’s decision to join a monetary
area should consider not just the situation that applies ex ante, that is, under monetary autonomy, but also
the conditions that would apply ex post, that is, allowing for the economic eﬀects of currency union. The
eﬀects on international trade have been discussed in a lively recent literature prompted by the ﬁndings of
Rose (2000). We review this literature and provide new results. We also ﬁnd that currency unions tend to
increase the co-movement of prices but are not systematically related to the co-movement of outputs.
We should emphasize that we do not address other issues that are important for currency adoption, such
as those related to ﬁnancial markets, ﬁnancial ﬂows, and borrower/lender relationships.4 We proceed this
way not because we think that these questions are unimportant, but rather because the focus of the present
inquiry is on diﬀerent issues.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the broad evolution of country sizes, numbers
of currencies, and currency areas in the post-World War II period. Section 3 reviews the implications of
the theoretical model of Alesina and Barro (2002), which we use as a guide for our empirical investigation.
Section 4 presents our data set. Section 5 uses the historical patterns in international trade ﬂows, inﬂation
rates, and the co-movements of prices and outputs to attempt to identify optimal currency areas. Section 6
considers how the formation of a currency union would change bilateral trade ﬂows and the co-movements
of prices and outputs. The last section concludes.
de l’Afrique or CFA franc. The othere is the BEAC, grouping Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon, with the common currency called the f r a n cd el aC o o p e r a t i o nF i n a n c i e r eA f r i c a i n e ,a l s ok n o w n
as the CFA franc. The two CFA francs are legal tender only in their respective regions, but the two currencies have maintained
a ﬁxed parity. Comoros issues its own form of CFA franc but has maintained a ﬁxed parity with the other two.
4For a recent theoretical discussion of these issues, see Gale and Vives (2002).
32 Countries and Currencies
In 1947 there were 76 independent countries in the world, whereas today there are 193. Many of today’s
countries are small: in 1995, 87 countries had a population less than 5 million. Figure 1, which is taken
from Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000), depicts the number of countries created and eliminated in the
last 150 years.5 In the period between World Wars I and II, international trade collapsed, and international
borders were virtually frozen. In contrast, after the end of World War II, the number of countries almost
tripled, and the volume of international trade and ﬁnancial transactions expanded dramatically. We view
these two developments as interrelated. First, small countries are economically viable when their market is
the world, in a relatively free-trade environment. Second, small countries have an interest in maintaining
open borders. Therefore, one should expect an inverse correlation between average country size and the
degree of trade openness and ﬁnancial integration.
Figure 2, also taken from Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000), shows a strong positive correlation over
the last 150 years between the detrended number of countries in the world and a detrended measure of the
volume of international trade. These authors show that this correlation does not just reﬂect the relabeling
of interregional trade as international trade when countries split. In fact, a similar pattern of correlation
holds if one measures world trade integration by the volume of international trade among countries that did
not change their borders. Alesina and Spolaore (2002) discuss these issues in detail and present current and
historical evidence on the relationship between country formation and international trade.
The number of independent currencies has increased substantially, until recently almost at the same pace
as the number of independent countries. In 1947, there were 65 currencies in circulation, whereas in 2001
there were 169. Between 1947 and 2001, the ratio of the number of currencies to the number of countries
remained roughly constant at about 85 per cent. Twelve of these currencies, in Europe, have now been
replaced by the euro, so we now have 158 currencies.
The increase in the number of countries and the deepening of economic integration should generate a
tendency to create multi-country currency areas, unless one believes that a country always deﬁnes the optimal
currency area. One implication of Mundell’s analysis is that political borders and currency boundaries should
not always coincide. In fact, as discussed in Alesina and Spolaore (2002), small countries can prosper in
a world of free trade and open ﬁnancial markets. Nevertheless, these small countries may lack the size
needed to provide eﬀectively some public goods that are subject to large economies of scale or to substantial
5The initial negative bar in 1870 represents the uniﬁcation of Germany.
4externalities. A currency may be one of these goods: a small country may be too small for an independent
money to be eﬃcient. To put it diﬀerently, various ethnic, linguistic, or culturally diﬀerent groups can enjoy
political independence by creating their own country. At the same time, this separate country can avoid
part of the costs of being economically small by using other countries to provide some public goods, such as
a currency.
A country constitutes, by deﬁnition, an optimal currency area only if one views a national money as
ac r i t i c a ls y m b o lo fn a t i o n a lp r i d ea n di d e n t i t y . H o w e ver, sometimes forms of nationalistic pride have led
countries into disastrous courses of action. Therefore, the argument that a national currency satisﬁes
nationalistic pride does not make an independent money economically or politically desirable. In fact,
why a nation would take pride in a currency escapes us; it is probably much more relevant to be proud
of an Olympic team. As for national identity, language and culture seem much more important than a
currency, yet many countries have willingly retained the language of their former colonizers. Moreover,
many countries undergoing extreme inﬂation, such as in South America, tended to change the names of their
moneys frequently, so even a sentimental attachment to the name “peso” or “dollar” seems not to be so
important.
In any event, as already mentioned, one can detect a recent tendency toward formation of multi-country
monetary areas. In the next decade, the ratio of currencies to independent countries may decrease substan-
tially, beginning with the adoption of the euro in 2002.
3 The costs and beneﬁts of currency unions
We view this analysis from the perspective of a potential client country that is considering the adoption of
another country’s money as a nominal anchor.
3.1 Trade beneﬁts
Country borders matter for trade ﬂows: two regions of the same country trade much more with each other
than they would if an international border were to separate them. McCallum (1995) looked at U.S.-Canadian
trade in 1988 and suggested that this eﬀect was extremely large: trade between Canadian provinces was
estimated to be a staggering 2200% larger than that between otherwise comparable provinces and states.
More recent work by Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) argues that this eﬀect from the U.S.-Canada border
5was vastly exaggerated but is still substantial: the presence of an international border is estimated to reduce
trade among industrialized countries by 30% and between the United States and Canada by 44%. The
question is what explains why national borders matter so much for trade even when there are no explicit trade
restrictions in place. Among other things, country borders tend to be associated with diﬀerent currencies.
Therefore, given that border eﬀects are so large, the elimination of one source of border costs–the change
of currencies–might have a large eﬀect on trade.6
Alesina and Barro (2002) investigate the relationship between currency unions and trade ﬂows. They
model the adoption of a common currency as a reduction of “iceberg” trading costs between two countries.
They ﬁnd that, under reasonable assumptions about elasticities of substitution between goods, countries
that trade more with each other beneﬁt more from adopting the same currency.7
Thus, countries that trade more with each other stand to gain more from adopting the same currency.
Also, smaller countries should, ceteris paribus, be more inclined to give up their currencies. Hence, as the
number of countries increases (and their average size shrinks), the number of currencies in the world should
increase less than proportionately.8
3.2 The beneﬁts of commitment
If an inﬂation prone country adopts the currency of a credible anchor, it eliminates the inﬂation-bias problem
pointed out by Barro and Gordon (1983). This bias may stem from two non-mutually exclusive sources: an
attempt to overstimulate the economy in a cyclical context and the incentive to monetize budget deﬁcits and
debts.
A ﬁxed exchange rate system, if totally credible, could achieve the same commitment beneﬁt as a currency
union. However, the recent world history shows that ﬁxed rates are not irrevocably ﬁxed; thus, they lack
6Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) argue that these border eﬀects on trade may have profound eﬀects on a host of ﬁnancial markets
a n dm a ye x p l a i nal o to fa n o m a l i e si ni n t e r n a t i o n a lﬁnancial transactions.
7The intuition for why this result does not hold unambiguously is the following. If two countries do not trade much with
each other initially, the likely reason is that the trading costs are high. Hence, the trade that does occur must have a high
marginal value. Speciﬁcally, if the trade occurs in intermediate inputs, then the marginal product of these inputs must be
high, because the trade occurs only if the marginal product is at least as high as the marginal cost. In this case, the reduction
of border costs due to the implementation of a currency union would expand trade in the intermediate goods that have an
especially high marginal product. Hence, it is possible that the marginal gain from the introduction of a currency union would
be greater when the existing volume of international trade is low.
8Alesina and Barro (2002) show that, under certain conditions, an even stronger result holds: as the number of countries
increases, the equilibrium number of currencies decreases.
6full credibility. Consequently, ﬁxed exchange rates can create instability in ﬁnancial markets. To the extent
that a currency union is more costly to break than a promise to maintain a ﬁxed exchange rate, the currency
adoption is more credible. In fact, once a country has a adopted a new currency, the costs of turning back are
quite high, certainly much higher than simply changing a ﬁxed parity to a new one. The ongoing situation
in Argentina demonstrates that the government really had created high costs for breaking a commitment
associated with a currency board and widespread dollarization of the economy. However, the costs were
apparently not high enough to deter eventual reneging on the commitment.
A country that abandons its currency receives the inﬂation rate of the anchor plus the change (positive
or negative) in its price level relative to that of the anchor. In other words, if the inﬂation rate in the United
States is two percent, then in Panama it will be two percent plus the change in relative prices between
Panama and the United States. Therefore, even if the anchor maintains domestic price stability, linkage to
the anchor does not guarantee full price stability for a client country.
The most likely anchors are large relative to the clients. In theory, a small but very committed country
could be a perfectly good anchor. However, ex post, a small anchor may be subject to political pressure
from the large client to abandon the committed policy. From an ex ante perspective, this consideration
disqualiﬁes the small country as a credible anchor.
In summary: The countries that stand to gain the most from giving up their currencies are those that have
a history of high and volatile inﬂation. This kind of history is a symptom of a lack of internal discipline for
monetary policy. Hence, to the extent that this lack of discipline tends to persist, such countries would beneﬁt
the most from the introduction of external discipline. Linkage to another currency is also more attractive if,
under the linked system, relative price levels between the countries would be relatively stable.
3.3 Stabilization policies
The abandonment of a separate currency implies the loss of an independent monetary policy. To the extent
that monetary policy would have contributed to business-cycle stabilization, the loss of monetary indepen-
dence implies costs in the form of wider cyclical ﬂuctuations of output.
The costs of giving up monetary independence are lower the higher the association of shocks between
the client and the anchor. The more the shocks are related the more the policy selected by the anchor will
be appropriate for the client as well. What turns out to matter is not the correlation of shocks, per se,
but rather the variance of the client country’s output expressed as a ratio to the anchor country’s output.
7This variance depends partly on the correlation of output (and, hence, of underlying shocks) and partly on
the individual variances of outputs. For example, a small country’s output may be highly correlated with
that in the United States. But, if the small country’s variance of output is much greater than that of the
United States, then the U.S. monetary policy will still be inappropriate for the client. In particular, the
magnitude of countercyclical monetary policy chosen by the United States will be too small from the client’s
perspective.
The costs implied by the loss of an independent money depend also on the explicit or implicit contract
that can be arranged between the anchor and its clients. We can think of two cases. In one, the anchor does
not change its monetary policy regardless of the composition and experience of its clients. Thus, clients that
have more shocks in common with the anchor stand to lose less from abandoning their independent policy
but have no inﬂuence on the monetary policy chosen by the anchor country. In the other case, the clients
can compensate the anchor to motivate the selection of a policy that takes into account the clients’ interests,
which will reﬂect the shocks that they experience. The ability to enter into such contracts makes currency
unions more attractive. However, even when these agreements are feasible, the greater the association of
shocks between clients and anchor, the easier it is to form a currency union. Speciﬁcally, it is cheaper for a
client to buy accommodation from an anchor that faces shocks that are similar to those faced by the clients.9
The allocation of seignorage arising from the client’s use of the anchor’s currency can be made part of the
compensation schemes.
The European Monetary Union is similar to this arrangement with compensation, because the monetary
policy of the union is not targeted to a speciﬁc country (say Germany) but, rather, to a weighted average of
each country’s shocks, that is, to aggregate euro-area shocks. In the discussion leading up to the formation
of the European Monetary Union, concerns about the degree of association among business cycles across
potential members were critical. In practice, the institutional arrangements within the European Union are
much more complex that a compensation scheme, but the point is that the ECB does not target the shocks
of any particular country but, rather, the average European shocks.10
In the case of developing countries, the costs of abandoning an independent monetary policy may not be
9Note that, in theory, a small country could be an ideal anchor because it is cheaper to compensate such an anchor for the
provision of monetary services that are tailored to the interests of clients. However, as discussed before, a small anchor may
lack credibility.
10The European Union also has speciﬁc prescriptions about the allocation of seignorage. The amounts are divided according
to the share of GDP of the various member countries. For a discussion of the European Central Bank policy objectives and
how this policy relates to individual country shocks, see Alesina et al (2001)
8that high because stabilization polices are typically not well used when exchange rates are ﬂexible. Recent
work by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (1999) suggests that developing
countries tend to follow procyclical monetary policies, speciﬁcally, they tend to raise interest rates in times
of distress to defend the value of their currency.11 To the extent that monetary policy is not properly used
as a stabilization device, the loss of monetary independence is not a substantial cost (and may actually be a
beneﬁt) for developing countries. However, recent work by Broda (2001) shows that countries with ﬂoating
exchange rate systems show superior performance in the face of terms-of-trade shocks. This pattern may
reﬂect the beneﬁts from independent monetary policies.
To summarize, the countries that have the largest co-movements of outputs and prices with potential
anchors are those with the lowest costs of abandoning monetary independence.
3.4 Trade, geography, and co-movements
Countries that trade more can beneﬁt more from currency unions for the reasons already discussed. Increased
trade may also raise the co-movements of outputs and prices. In this case, there is a second reason why
countries that trade more would have a greater net beneﬁt from adopting a currency union.
An established literature on the “gravity model” of trade shows that bilateral trade volumes are well
explained by a set of geographical and economic variables, such as the distance between the countries and
the sizes and incomes of the countries. Note that the term “distance” has to be interpreted broadly to
include not only literal geographical distance, but also whether the countries share a common language,
legal system, and so on. In addition, some geographical variables may inﬂuence co-movements of outputs
and prices beyond their eﬀects through trade. For example, locational proximity and weather patterns may
relate to the nature of underlying shocks, which in turn inﬂuence the co-movements.
Whether more trade always means more co-movements of outputs and prices is not a settled issue. On
the theoretical side, the answer depends largely on whether trade is inter-industry or intra-industry. In the
latter case, more trade likely leads to more co-movements. However, in the former case, increased trade
may stimulate sectoral specialization across countries. This heightened specialization likely lowers the co-
movements of outputs and prices, because industry speciﬁc shocks would become country speciﬁcs h o c k s . 12
11A literature on Latin America, prompted mostly by a paper by Gavin and Perotti (1997), has also shown that ﬁscal policy
has the “wrong” cyclical properties. That is, surpluses tend to appear during recessions and deﬁcits during expansions.
12See Frankel and Rose (1998) for the argument that more trade favors more correlated business cycles. See Krugman (1993)
for the opposite argument. For an extensive theoretical and empirical discussion of these issues, see Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha
9The type of trade between two countries is also likely inﬂuenced by the levels of per capita GDP, for example,
intra-industry trade tends to be much more important for rich countries.
In summary, geographical or gravity variables aﬀect bilateral trade and, as a result, the costs and beneﬁts
of currency unions. Some geographical variables may have an aﬀect on the attractiveness of currency unions
beyond those operating through the trade channel.
4D a t a a n d m e t h o d o l o g y
4.1 Data description and sources
Data on outputs and prices come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and Penn
World Tables 5.6. Combining both sources, we form a panel of countries with yearly data on outputs and
prices from 1960 to 1997 (or, in some cases, for shorter periods). For output, we use real per capita GDP
expressed in 1995 U.S. dollars. To compute relative prices, we use a form of real exchange rate relating to the
price level for gross domestic products. The measure is the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) for GDP divided
by the U.S. dollar exchange rate.13 In the ﬁrst instance, this measure gives us the price level in country
i relative to that in the United States, Pi,t/PUS,t. We then compute relative prices between countries i
and j by dividing the value for country i by that for country j.I n ﬂation is computed as the continuously
compounded (log-diﬀerence) growth rate of the GDP deﬂator, coming from World Development Indicators.
Bilateral trade information comes from Glick and Rose (2001), which in turn is extracted from the
International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics. These data are expressed in real U.S. dollars.14
To compute bilateral distances, we use the great-circle-distance algorithm provided by Gray (2001).
Data on location, as well as contiguity, access to water, language, and colonial relationships come from
the CIA World Fact Book 2001. Data on free-trade agreements come from Glick and Rose (2000) and are
complemented with data from the World Trade Organization web page.
(2001, 2002) and Imbs (2000).
13Pi =
PPP of GDPi
Ex.rate measures how many units of U.S. output can be purchased with one unit of country i0s output, that is,
it measures the relative price of country i0s output with respect to that of the United States. By deﬁnition, this price is always
one when i is the United States.
14Glick and Rose (2001) deﬂated the original nominal values of trade by the U.S. consumer price index, with 1982-84=100.
We use the same index to express trade values in 1995 U.S. dollars.
104.2 The computation of co-movements
We pair all countries and calculate bilateral relative prices, Pit/Pjt. (This ratio measures the value of one
unit of country i’s output relative to one unit of country j’s output.) This procedure generates 21,321
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The estimated residual, ˆ εt,i,j, measures the relative price that would not be predictable from the two prior
values of relative prices. We then use as a measure of (lack of) co-movement of relative prices the root-mean-
squared error:
VP ij ≡







The lower VP ij, the greater the co-movement of prices between countries i and j.
We proceed analogously to compute a measure of output co-movement. The value VY ij comes from the
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The estimated residual, ˆ utij, measures the relative output that would not be predictable from the two
prior values of relative output. We then use as a measure of (lack of) co-movement of relative outputs the
root-mean-squared error:
VY ij ≡





The lower VY ij, the greater the co-movement of outputs between countries i and j.
For most countries all of the data are available. However, we exclude from the computation of co-movements
15We use fewer observations when the full time series from 1960 to 1997 is unavailable. However, we drop country-pairs for
which fewer than 20 observations are available.
11country pairs for which we do not have at least 20 observations. Note that this limitation implies that we
cannot include in our analysis most of central and eastern Europe, a region in which some countries are
likely clients of the euro.
5 Which currency areas?
In this section, we sketch “natural” currency areas, based on the criteria discussed above. For anchor
currencies, we consider the U.S. dollar, the euro, and the yen. We are not assuming that all countries have
to belong to one of the unions centered around these three currencies. In fact, many countries turn out not
to be good clients for any of the anchors and seem to be better oﬀ by keeping their own currency. Therefore,
we are addressing the question of which countries would be better served by joining some currency union,
as well as the question of which anchor should be chosen if one is needed.
5.1 Inﬂation, trade, and co-movements
We begin in Table 1a by showing the average inﬂation rate, using the GDP deﬂator, for selected countries
and groups in our sample from 1970 to 1990. We stopped at 1990 because, in the 1990s, several countries
adopted currency arrangements, such as the EMS, that contributed to reduced inﬂation. We are interested
here mostly in capturing inﬂation rates that would arise in the absence of a monetary anchor. We take the
1970s and 1980s (that is, after Bretton Woods and before the recent emphasis on nominal anchors) as a
period with few true monetary anchors. We show the 20 countries with the highest average inﬂation rates,
along with the averages for industrialized countries and for regional groups of developing countries.
The top 5 average rates of inﬂation are all Latin American countries, and 7 Latin American countries
are in the top 11. The top 5 countries had an average annual inﬂation rate above 280%. Despite its poor
economic performance in other dimensions, Africa does not have a very high average inﬂation rate. While
there are 6 African countries in the top 20, the average for the continent is brought down by the countries
in the CFA franc zone, which have relatively low inﬂation records. The Middle East is the second highest
inﬂation group, with two countries, Israel and Lebanon, in the top 13 with inﬂation rates of 78% and 44%,
respectively. In the euro-zone, Greece and Italy lead in the rankings, with inﬂation rates of 16% and 13%,
respectively. Overall, 11 countries had an average annual inﬂation rate of more than 50 percent, 30 countries
had an average inﬂation above 20 percent, and 72 countries exceeded 10 percent.
12Table 1b shows inﬂation variability and is organized in the same way as Table 1a. Since average inﬂation
and inﬂation variability are strongly positively correlated, 16 of the top 20 countries in Table 1a are also in
the top 20 of Table 1b. However, in some cases, such as Chile, the high average inﬂation rate (107 percent)
reﬂected one episode of hyperinﬂation followed by relative stability. In others, such as Colombia, the fairly
high average inﬂation rate (22 percent) resulted from a long period of moderate, double-digit inﬂation.
Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c list for selected countries and groups the average trade-to-GDP ratios16 over 1960-
97 with three potential anchors for currency areas: the United States, the euro area (based on the twelve
members), and Japan. The GDP value in the denominator of these ratios refers to the country paired with
the potential anchor.
The tables show that Japan is an economy that is relatively closed; moreover, in comparison with the
United States and the euro region, Japan’s trade is more dispersed across partners. Hence, few countries
exhibit a high trade-to-GDP ratio with Japan. Notably, industrial countries’ average trade share with Japan
is below one percent. Among developing countries, oil exporters have a high trade share with Japan, but
still below that with the euro-12. Singapore, Malaysia,H o n gK o n ga n dI n d o n e s i ae x h i b i tar e l a t i v e l yh i g h
trade-to-GDP ratio with Japan (above 7 percent), but Singapore and Hong Kong trade even more with the
United States. For the United States, aside from Hong Kong and Singapore, a good portion of Latin America
has a high ratio of trade to GDP. Canada is notable for trading almost exclusively with the United States:
the trade ratio is 18 percent, compared with 1.7 percent for the euro-12 and 1.4 percent for Japan. African
countries, broadly speaking, trade signiﬁcantly more with Europe, but some of them, such as Angola and
Nigeria, are also closely linked with the United States.
Tables 3a, 3b, and 3c report our measures of the co-movements of prices for selected countries with the
United States, the euro-12 area, and Japan.17 Remember that a higher number means less co-movement.
Panama and Puerto Rico, which use the U.S. dollar, have the highest co-movements of prices with the United
States. These two are followed by Canada and El Salvador, which has recently dollarized. Members of the
OECD have fairly high price co-movements with all three of the potential anchors (which are themselves
members of the OECD). For Japan, the countries that are most closely related in terms of price co-movements
lack a clear geographical distribution. For the euro-12, the euro members and other western European
countries have a high degree of price co-movement. African countries also have relatively high price co-
16The trade measure is equivalent to the average of imports and exports. Glick and Rose’s (2001) values come from averaging
four measures of bilateral trade (as reported for imports and exports by the partners on each side of both transactions).
17Recall that we compute co-movements only for pairs of countries for which we have at least 20 annual observations.
13movements with the euro-12, higher than that with the United States.
Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c report our measures of the co-movements of outputs (per capita GDPs) for selected
countries with the United States, the euro-12 area, and Japan.18 The general picture is reasonably similar
to that for prices. Note that all of the OECD countries have relatively high output co-movements with the
three anchors, particularly with the euro-12. Japan’s business cycle seems to be somewhat less associated
with the rest of the world: even developing countries in Asia tend to exhibit, on average, higher output
co-movements with the euro-12. The regional patterns show that Africa is generally more associated with
the euro-12, whereas there is more ambiguity for Latin America.
Overall, Japan is a worse anchor than the United States and the euro-12 because fewer countries are
associated with Japan in terms of price and output co-movements, and trade ﬂows to Japan are more
dispersed across partners. Africa is more associated in terms of price and output co-movements with the
euro-12 than with the United States, and Africa also trades more with the euro zone. North America is
highly associated with the United States. As for Latin America, this region trades overall more with the
United States than with the euro zone or Japan. However, co-movements of prices and outputs for this
region are not much higher with respect to the United States than they are with the euro-12. An interesting
case is Argentina. In terms of co-movements of prices and outputs, Argentina is more associated with the
euro area than with the United States. Mexico, in contrast, is much more associated in its price and output
co-movements with the United States. In Asia, Hong Kong and Singapore are more associated with the
United States than with Japan.
Looking at the tables, the patterns of trade and price and output co-movements suggest geographically
connected areas that are linked to the U.S. dollar (North and part of South America) and the euro zone
(Europe and Africa). For Japan, at most a small part of east Asia seems to apply.
5.2 Which Currency Unions?
This section brings together the data already presented to discuss which currency unions appear most
attractive in terms of the criteria suggested by the underlying theory. The natural clients, with respect to
the three proposed anchors, are those countries that have no ability to commit to low inﬂation (as evidenced
by a history of high and variable inﬂation), that trade a lot (at least potentially) with the anchor, and have
high price and output co-movements with the anchor. The implicit assumption here is that the patterns
18As for prices, we consider only pairs of countries for which we have at least 20 observations.
14for trade and co-movements that apply ex ante (under monetary autonomy) would also apply at least in a
relative sense ex post (under a currency union).
We begin in Table 5 by listing the 28 countries in our sample with average inﬂation rates of at least 15
percent per year from 1970 to 1990.19 We suggest that these countries are likely to have a high demand for
an external nominal anchor because of their evident lack of commitment to low inﬂation. We then list for
these countries their trade shares and measures of price and output co-movements with the three potential
anchors.
Table 6 summarizes the information from Table 5 by listing for each of the three criteria (trade, price
co-movement, and output co-movement) which of the three anchors is best. A bold entry means that the
chosen anchor is “much” superior to the other two, a regular font means that the diﬀerence with at least
one other anchor is small. More speciﬁcally, a bold entry in the trade column means that the highest trade
share with one of the three potential anchors is more than four percentage points higher than that of the
second of the three. In the case of price co-movements, a bold entry means that the absolute value of the
diﬀerence between the most associated of the three and the second one is larger that 0.025. For the output
co-movement, the same deﬁnition applies with a cut oﬀ of 0.005. These cut-oﬀ choices are arbitrary, but the
reader using the data reported in Table 5 can calculate another cut-oﬀ. These criteria emphasize the choice
among potential anchors, rather than the choice of whether to retain an independent currency.
Several interesting observations emerge from Table 6. First, Japan is not an attractive anchor for virtually
any of the high-inﬂation countries. Out of 96 entries in the table, only 8 (which includes one tie) are for
Japan. No case has more than one of the criteria in favor of Japan.
Second, high inﬂation Latin American countries are by no means a clear dollarization block. In fact,
Brazil might be better served by adopting the euro. (Although there is no clear superiority in terms of trade
or price co-movements, the euro performs better in terms of co-movement of output.) The case of Argentina
is interesting: having one of the highest inﬂation rates, this country seemst ob eo n eo ft h eb e s te x a m p l e s
of a place with a high demand for an external currency anchor. However, as shown in Table 5, Argentina
has been highly closed to international trade, and its output and price co-movements are not high with any
of the three potential anchors. So, other than its lack of commitment ability, Argentina does not appear
to be an obvious member of a currency union with the euro or the U.S. dollar. In contrast, Mexico and
Ecuador look much closer to the U.S. dollar than to the euro. The same conclusion applies to the Dominican
19We restrict this analysis to countries with populations larger than 500,000 in 1997. The analysis is also constrained by data
availability: only countries with data on co-movements of output and prices are considered.
15Republic. Nicaragua has low co-movements with all three anchors, but its exports go mostly toward Europe.
Hence, the euro might be a better choice than the U.S. dollar. Chile and Uruguay have higher exports to
Europe, but they have larger co-movements with the United States.
Third, looking at countries at the geographical boundaries of Europe, in some cases their natural anchor
is the euro: this conclusion applies to Greece (which has joined the euro zone) and Turkey. Israel might
be a good candidate for the euro, although it could also be well served by the U.S. dollar. As for Africa,
trade shares are much higher with Europe. Co-movements are, however, just as high with the United States.
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone seem to be natural euro clients, but other African countries are less
clear.
We have measured lack of ability to commit based on the past inﬂation experience. One could also look at
institutional measures of potential commitment, such as the degree of central bank independence. However,
although this measure has some explanatory power for inﬂation performance among OECD countries, it does
not seem to explain much for developing countries.20
High inﬂation countries are not the only potential clients of an anchor. If a country trades extensively
with a potential anchor, then adopting the anchor currency may be a good strategy even if the inﬂation
rate under autonomy were low. In Table 7, we report all the countries that have a trade share with at least
one of the potential anchors of at least 9 percent of GDP. In column one we report the name of the anchor
that has the highest trade share; when more that one anchor has a value of at least 9 per cent, we report
all in decreasing order. For example, if country X’s trade share was 15 percent of its GDP with the United
States and 9 percent with the euro-12, the column would read USA/Euro. In the next column, we report
the name of the anchor with the highest co-movements of prices and output, with the same convention as
before concerning the bold entries.
The ﬁrst inference from Table 7 is that the countries for m i n gt h ee u r o - 1 2a r e ad os e e mt ob e l o n gt o g e t h e r .
The same observation applies to other European countries that are not currently members of the euro-12,
such as Sweden and Switzerland. Second, African countries trade more with Europe than with the United
States or Japan, so, by and large, the best potential anchor for Africa is the euro. Note that the CFA franc
zone is already tied to the euro. Third, Central American countries trade much more with the United States.
Fourth, for several East Asian countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, the U.S. dollar appears to be
superior to the yen as a potential anchor. These Asian countries trade more with the United States and are
more closely associated with the U.S. business cycle. Canada is extremely tied to the United States in any
20See Alesina and Summers (1993) for OECD country evidence and Cukierman (1992) for evidence on developing countries.
16dimension.21
Overall, we ﬁnd that geographically connected currency areas tend to emerge with the U.S. dollar and
the euro as the anchor. However, Japan does not emerge as much of an anchor. Putting together the results
from Table 7 with those of Tables 5 and 6, we draw the following conclusions. 1) There seems to be a fairly
clear dollar area involving Canada, Mexico, most of Central America, and parts of South America (excluding
Argentina and Brazil). Farther aﬁeld geographically, the dollar zone seems also to encompass some Asian
countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore. 2) The euro area includes all of western Europe and most of
Africa. Argentina might actually be better served by joining the euro area than the dollar area. However,
the only criterion for Argentina to be seeking any anchor is her history of high inﬂation. 3) There does
not seem to be any clear yen area. 4) There are several countries that do not appear in Tables 5-7. These
are countries with low inﬂation that do not trade much with any of the three potential anchors. Primary
examples are India, Australia, and New Zealand.
It is worthwhile to compare brieﬂy our results with those of Ghosh and Wolf (1994), who use a diﬀerent
approach to assess the pros and cons for regions and countries to form currency unions. They argue that
optimal currency areas are typically formed by countries that are geographically disconnected. For example,
they conclude that Europe and the states of the United States are not optimal currency areas. We have
not examined the U.S. states, but Europe does present a good case for a currency union based on our
examination of the patterns of trade and co-movements of prices and outputs. More generally, despite some
exceptions, geographical proximity typically ﬁts well with our criteria for currency unions. The diﬀerences
between our ﬁndings and those of Ghosh and Wolf seem to arise because they do not emphasize the link
between currency unions and trade and because they assume a very high cost from imperfect synchronization
of business cycles.
Ideally, we would go beyond the simple criteria thus far advanced to evaluate the relative costs and
beneﬁts of the trade-oﬀ leading to the choice of currency adoption. For example, should a country such
as Argentina with high inﬂation but low co-movements with the United States and the euro zone remain
autonomous or use the dollar or the euro? How much can trade beneﬁts of a currency union compensate for
the loss of monetary autonomy? To answer these questions, we need more quantitative information than we
have yet generated.
21See Buiter (1999) for a discussion of this point.
176 What changes with currency adoption?
Thus far, we have discussed the possible conﬁguration of currency areas based on the behavior of inﬂation,
trade, and the co-movements of prices and outputs that prevail (in most cases) before the creation of a
currency union. In choosing whether to join a monetary area, a potential entrant would have to estimate the
values of trade and co-movements that would apply after the entry. In practice, this calculation is diﬃcult–
for the potential entrant and also for the econometrician.22 In the next section, we discuss estimates of
eﬀects from joining a currency union on international trade ﬂows. Then we discuss some new estimates of
eﬀects of currency union on trade and on co-movements of prices and outputs.
6.1 Currency unions and international trade: the available evidence
Most of the existing empirical work on the eﬀects of currency unions on trade ﬂows has been framed in the
context of the standard “gravity model.” According to this approach, the bilateral trade between a pair of
countries is increasing in their GDPs and is inversely related to their distance, broadly construed to include
all factors that create “trade resistance.” The gravity equation is then augmented with a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the countries share the same currency. The estimate of the coeﬃcient on this
dummy is interpreted as the currency-union eﬀect. In the seminal paper in this area, Rose (2000) reports
that bilateral trade between two countries that use the same currency is, controlling for other eﬀects, over
two-hundred-percent larger than bilateral trade between countries that use diﬀerent currencies.
The apparently large eﬀect of currency unions on trade is surprising because estimates of the eﬀect of
reduced exchange rate volatility on trade are small (see, for example, De Grauwe and Skudelny [2000], Frankel
and Wei [1993], and Eichengreen and Irwin [1995]). Moreover, fees on currency conversion are typically a
small percentage of total transaction costs.23 On the other hand, as already discussed, border eﬀects on
trade are large, and perhaps these large eﬀects can be explained by the necessity to use diﬀerent currencies
on the two sides of a border.
Numerous empirical studies, summarized in Table 8, have examined and extended Rose’s research. Pakko
and Wall (2001) focus on time-series variation, which involves cases in which currency union is either im-
plemented or abandoned. Their ﬁndings reveal a negative, though insigniﬁcant, eﬀect of currency union on
22Issing (2001) argues that one should expect that prices and outputs will move more closely together in the European Union
after the adoption of the euro.
23The argument that currency conversion fees are low may not apply to trade in capital, where the currency turnover is
extremely high and, hence, small proportionate costs can translate into large disbursements.
18trade. However, Glick and Rose (2002) use an expanded panel data set that includes more episodes of regime
switching. With this enlarged data set, they ﬁnd large and positive estimates from the time-series variation.
Rose (2001) provides new estimates of the eﬀect of currency unions on trade, making use of the time-series
as well as cross-sectional variation in the data. This study reports a wide range of estimates, using diﬀerent
samples and techniques. Point estimates range from a negative, though insigniﬁcant, eﬀect of - 68%, using
ﬁxed eﬀects in the original sample, to a 708% eﬀect using a matching sample technique and a much broader
data base.
Rose and Van Wincoop (2001), Nitsch (2002), Melitz (2001), Klein (2002), and Levy (2001) address
problems of aggregation bias, arguing that pooling diﬀerent currency unions may mask diﬀerential eﬀects.
Yet, all these studies point toward a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on trade. Thom and Walsh (2001) present
a case study on Ireland’s break with sterling, ﬁnding no signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade. Other studies, including
Flandreau and Maurel (2001) and Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2001), focus on pre-WWI data.
The underlying assumption in the various empirical studies is that currency unions are randomly chosen.
Standard endogeneity problems can, however, confound the estimates. For example, the presence of currency
union may encourage trade, but the presence or potential for substantial trade may also stimulate the
formation of a currency union. The use of country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects, employed in some of the studies, may
not alleviate this simultaneity problem because a shift at some point in trade linkages may be related to the
change in the propensity to form a currency union.
Similarly, the existence of a currency union may reﬂect unmeasured characteristics that also inﬂuence
the volume of bilateral international trade. The currency union dummy can get credit for the eﬀects of these
unobserved variables. As examples, compatibility in legal systems, greater cultural links, and tied bilateral
transfers may increase the propensity to form a currency union as well as strengthen trade links between two
countries. In these cases, the OLS estimate of the currency union eﬀect on trade tends to be biased upward.
Other omitted variables may bias OLS estimates in the opposite direction. For example, a higher level of
monopoly power means higher mark-ups, which tend to deter trade. At the same time, a greater degree of
monopoly distortion may lead to higher inﬂation rates under discretion and, thereby, increase the desire to
join a currency union as a commitment device to reduce inﬂation.
Persson (2001) voices a diﬀerent critique based on the potential for self-selection in the decision to form
a currency union. Among other distinctive features, countries that have been engaged in currency unions
during the past decades are typically small and poor, tend to be geographically close, and are likely to share
tight cultural links. Examples are the 15 countries of the CFA-franc zone in Africa, the seven members of
19the Eastern Caribbean Currency Area, and the unilaterally dollarized Panama, Puerto Rico, and Bermuda.
Systematic diﬀerences in observable characteristics can distort OLS estimates when the eﬀect of using the
same currency diﬀe r sa c r o s sg r o u p so rw h e nt h e r ea r eo t h e rt y p e so f non-linearities in the trade relation that
have been ignored. Using semi-parametric methods, Persson’s study ﬁnds little support for a currency-union
eﬀect on trade; his point estimates, ranging from 13% to 45%, are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. This result is not surprising, however, because the matching procedure–designed to deal with non-
linearities in observable variables–throws out much of the information in the sample. Moreover, as already
noted, when Rose (2001) applies the matching approach to a broader data set, he obtains an enormous
estimate for the eﬀect of currency union on trade.
Another concern is a mechanical problem caused by sample selection. Previous estimates of the currency
union eﬀect were based on a sample of countries with positive bilateral trade ﬂows. Pairs of countries
with zero trade ﬂows–typically pairs of small countries–were excluded from the sample to satisfy the
log-speciﬁcation of the gravity equation. This issue may be important because roughly half of the annual
country-pair observations exhibit zero trade.
6.2 The eﬀects of currency unions: new results
To address the various estimation issues, Tenreyro (2002) begins by studying the empirical determinants of
past and present currency unions.24 She uses a probit analysis for all country pairings from 1960 to 1997
with four potential currency anchors: Australia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.25 The
anchors used here are diﬀerent from the hypothetical ones considered before for obvious reasons: the euro
did not exist before 2002, and the now defunct French franc was historically an important anchor currency.
Interestingly, the yen was never an anchor for anyone.
The main results, reported in Table 9, are that a currency union with one of the four candidate anchors
is more likely if the client country is (1) closer geographically to the anchor; (2) has the same language as
the anchor; (3) is a former or current colony of the anchor; (4) is poorer in terms of per capita GDP; and
(5) is smaller, in terms of population size. The probability is increasing in the per capita GDP of the anchor
(among the four considered). Elements that do not matter signiﬁcantly include island or land-locked status
24Persson (2001) also modeled the choice of curreny union, but he did not use this analysis to construct instrumental variables.
25Her analysis, unlike Rose’s (2000), treats the CFA countries as in a currency union with France. She also departs from
Rose in treating the ECCA countries as in a currency union with the United States since 1976 and with the United Kingdom
before that.
20and a common border with the potential anchor.
Our general idea is to use the estimated model for the propensity of a country to enter into a currency
union to form an instrumental variable for the currency-union dummy. However, it does not work directly
to use the estimates from the probit equation because the determinants of the probability of currency union
(such as distance and other gravity variables) also enter directly into the determinants of bilateral trading
volume. Hence, Tenreyro (2002) adopts an indirect approach.
Consider any potential client country, i, which is evaluating the adoption of a currency with one of the
four anchors considered, denoted by k =1 ,2,3,4. The probit regression determines the estimated probability,
p(i,k), of the currency adoption. This probability depends on the distance between i and k and the other
variables mentioned above. If the countries take their currency union decisions independently, then the joint
probability that i and j use the currency of anchor k will be given by
Jk(i,j)=p(i,k) ∗ p(j,k).
Note that Jk(i,j) will be high if countries i and j are both close to potential anchor k. The idea, for example,
is that Ecuador and El Salvador currently share a common money (the U.S. dollar) not because they are
close to each other but, rather, because each is close to the United States and, hence, each was independently
motivated to adopt the U.S. dollar.
The joint probability that i and j use the same foreign currency (among the four candidates considered)








One can then use the variable J(i,j) as an instrument for the currency-union dummy, for example, in
equations for bilateral trade between countries i and j. The underlying assumption for the validity of this
instrument is that the bilateral trade between countries i and j depends on bilateral gravity variables for
i and j but not on gravity variables involving third countries, notably those associated with the potential
anchor countries k. These gravity variables involving third countries aﬀect the propensity of countries i and
26For a pair of anchors, say, k1 and k2, the probability is J(k1,k 2)=p(k1,k 2) ∗ [1 − p(k1,k 3) − p(k1,k 4)].+p(k1,k 2) ∗ [1 −
p(k2,k 3) − p(k2,k 4)]+
P4
s=3 p(k1,k s) ∗ p(k2,k s).
21j to be part of the same currency zone and, thereby, inﬂuence bilateral trade between i and j through that
channel. However, these variables do not (by assumption) directly inﬂuence the bilateral trade between i
and j.
Tenreyro (2002) uses the new instrument for the currency-union dummy to estimate relations for pairs
of countries for trading volume, co-movement of prices, and co-movement of outputs. We present some of
these results in Table 10, which, for brevity, reports only the estimated coeﬃcients of the currency-union
variable.
For bilateral trade, the results use annual data from 1960 to 1997 for all pairs of countries. Taking account
of data availability, this system comprises over 300,000 observations (when we include the roughly half of
the sample that has zeroes for bilateral trade). The dependent variable is measured as log(trade + positive
constant), where the presence of the positive constant allows us to include the zero-trade observations in
the regressions. For the results shown in Table 10, the constant is set to 100 1995 U.S. dollars. The system
includes as independent variables a set of usual gravity measures–log of geographical distance, membership
in a regional trade agreement, common language, former and current colonial relationship, common colonizer,
common border, and island and land-locked status–along with the logs of GDP per capita, population, and
area for each country in a pair.27 The OLS estimates of the gravity variables are typically signiﬁcant.28
Table 10 shows that the estimated coeﬃcient on the currency-union dummy variable is 0.75 (s.e.=0.20)
when country ﬁxed eﬀects are excluded and 0.91 (0.18) when country ﬁxed eﬀects (not country-pair eﬀects)
are included. These results accord reasonably well with those presented by Rose (2000), despite two major
diﬀerences in the approaches. First, since he used log(trade) as the dependent variable, he discarded all of
the zero trade observations (which, as mentioned, constitute roughly half of the sample). Second, we deﬁned
the currency-union dummy more liberally than Rose, in that we treated the CFA franc countries as in a
union with the French franc and the ECCA countries as in a union with the U.S. dollar or the British pound
(depending on the time period). The estimated eﬀect of the currency-union dummy variable is larger if we
adopt Rose’s more restrictive deﬁnition of a currency union.29
More interestingly, the estimated eﬀects of currency union on bilateral trade become larger when we
estimate by instrumental variables, using the instrument discussed before. As shown in Table 10, the esti-
mated coeﬃcient on the currency-union dummy variable becomes 1.56 (0.44) when country ﬁxed eﬀects are
27See the bottom of Table 10 for the list of independent variables.
28T h ee r r o rt e r m si nt h es y s t e m sa r ea l l o w e dt ob ec o r r e l a t e do v e rt i m ef o rag i v e nc o u n t r yp a i r .
29The OLS estimates become 1.24 (0.25) without country ﬁxed eﬀects and 1.06 (0.23) with country ﬁxed eﬀects.
22excluded and 2.70 (0.44) when these ﬁxed eﬀects are included.30 Hence, these results support the argument
that currency union has an important positive eﬀect on bilateral trade. Moreover, these instrumental esti-
mates provide some reason to believe that the causality runs from currency union to trade, rather than the
reverse.
The co-movement of prices is measured by the negative of the standard error VP ij discussed before.
In this case, the sample consists of one observation (estimated for 1960-97) on each country pair for pairs
that have the necessary data. We relate this measure of price co-movement to the gravity variables already
mentioned and to various measures of country size (logs of per capita GDP, population, and area). Most of
the gravity variables turn out to be statistically insigniﬁcant in the estimates, although common language
and a common colonial heritage are associated with greater price co-movement. Co-movement also rises with
the log of per capita GDP of each country but falls with the log of area of each country.
Table 10 shows that the currency-union dummy is signiﬁcantly positive for price co-movement, with an es-
timated coeﬃcient of 0.069 (s.e.=0.006) when country ﬁxed eﬀects are excluded and 0.046 (0.003) when these
ﬁxed eﬀects are included. These estimated eﬀects are substantial relative to the mean of the co-movement
variable (the negative of the price equation standard deviation) of -0.16. The positive estimated eﬀect of
currency union on price co-movement may emerge because currency-union countries avoid the sometimes
volatile inﬂation rates and nominal exchange rates that characterize other regimes. The instrumental esti-
mates are even higher than those generated by OLS. In this case, the estimated coeﬃcients are 0.24 (0.02)
when country ﬁxed eﬀects are excluded and 0.087 (0.008) when these ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
The co-movement of outputs is measured by the negative of the standard error VY ij discussed before. The
sample again comprises one observation (estimated for 1960-97) on each country pair with the available data.
The explanatory variables are the same as those used for price co-movements. The main eﬀects from the
gravity variables turn out to be positive relationships with a common border, a common language, and with
prior and current colonial linkages. However, Table 10 shows that the estimated coeﬃcients on the currency-
union dummy variable are typically insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. These results may arise because, as
discussed before, the theoretical link between currency union and output co-movement is ambiguous.
30The estimated eﬀects are even larger if we adopt Rose’s (2000) more restrictive deﬁnition of currency unions. In the
instrumental estimation, the estimated coeﬃcients of the currency-union dummy variable are then 2.72 (0.75) when country
ﬁxed eﬀects are excluded and 4.68 (0.79) when these ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
237C o n c l u s i o n s
The basic message of this paper is two-fold. First, based on the historical data on inﬂation, trade, and co-
movements of prices and outputs, we argued that there exist well-deﬁned dollar and euro areas but no clear
yen area. Second, it is likely that the adoption of another’s country’s currency increases bilateral trade and
raises the co-movement of prices. These responses suggest that our examination of the trade patterns and
co-movements that applied before the adoption of a common currency would underestimate the potential
beneﬁts from joining a currency union.
Several issues should be considered in future empirical research. First, the results of the instrumental
estimation for the eﬀects of currency union need to be analyzed more fully. Second, these results can be used
to estimate how the introduction of a currency union would aﬀect trade and the co-movements of prices and
outputs for individual country-pairs under the hypothetical adoption of a currency union with a speciﬁed
anchor country. These results would then feed back into our previous analysis of the desirable pattern of
world currency unions. Third, using methodologies analogous to those used in this paper, we can assess
the formation of currency unions that are not linked to a ”major” anchor. For example, we can evaluate
a Latin American currency union or the proposed unions in southern Africa and among the Persian Gulf
states. Fourth, we expect to make particular use of the evidence that accumulates from the experience of
the European Monetary Union.
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*Based on GDP deflators.  Source: WDI 2001.
**This group includes only countries with 1997 population above 500,000.
Table 1a.  Mean Annual Inflation Rate (percent per year),    
1970-1990* 



















Congo, Dem. Rep. 36
Industrial Countries
unweighted mean 4.6






*Std. dev. of annual inflation rates, based on GDP deflators. Source: WDI 2001.
**This group includes only countries with 1997 population above 500,000.
Table 1b.  Inflation Rate Variability (percent per year),     
1970-1990*
Countries with High Inflation Variability                             




























**This group includes only countries with 1997 population above 500,000.
Table 2a.  Average Trade-to-GDP Ratio with U.S. 
(percent), 1960-1997*
High Trade-Ratio Countries**
*Trade is the average of imports and exports.  (Imports is the average of the 
values reported by the importer and the exporter.  Idem for exports.)  
Averages are for 1960-97 (when GDP data are not available, the average 
corresponds to the period of availability).  The equations for co-movement 
include only one observation for each pair, corresponding to the period 1960-
97. The explanatory variables then refer to averages over time.  Source: Glick 
















Congo, Dem. Rep. 17.0%
Slovenia 16.9%
Angola 15.6%
Syrian Arab Republic 15.2%
Industrial Countries
unweighted mean 7.3%






**This group includes only countries with 1997 population above 500,000.
Table 2b.  Average Trade-to-GDP Ratio with Euro_12, 
1960-1997*
High Trade-Ratio Countries**
*Trade is the average of imports and exports.  (Imports is the average of the 
values reported by the importer and the exporter.  Idem for exports.)  
Averages are for 1960-97 (when GDP data are not available, the average 
corresponds to the period of availability).  Source: Glick & Rose (trade 
values); WDI 2001 (GDP).  For a Euro-12 country, the trade ratios apply to 
the other 11 countries. Oman 16.0%





Papua New Guinea 9.2%
Bahrain 8.4%
Saudi Arabia 8.0%



















**This group includes only countries with 1997 population above 500,000.
Table 2c.  Average Trade-to-GDP Ratio with Japan,    
1960-1997*
High Trade-Ratio Countries**
*Trade is the average of imports and exports.  (Imports is the average of the 
values reported by the importer and the exporter.  Idem for exports.)  Averages 
are for 1960-97 (when GDP data are not available, the average corresponds to 
the period of availability).  Source: Glick & Rose (trade values); WDI 2001 
(GDP). Puerto Rico 0.0193                                              
Panama 0.0244                                              
Canada 0.0335                                              
El Salvador 0.0340                                              
Singapore 0.0444                                              
Thailand 0.0529                                              
Guinea 0.0545                                              
Bahrain 0.0563                                              
Hong Kong, China 0.0566                                              
Honduras 0.0571                                              
Malaysia 0.0609                                              
Saudi Arabia 0.0646                                              
Australia 0.0664                                              
Fiji 0.0666                                              
Hungary 0.0673                                              
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.0681                                              
Cyprus 0.0687                                              
Tunisia 0.0689                                              
New Zealand 0.0691                                              
Norway 0.0671                                              
Industrial Countries
unweighted mean 0.0830                                              
Developing Countries, unweighted means
Africa 0.1445                                              
Asia 0.0913                                              
Europe 0.1107                                              
Middle East 0.1348                                              
Western Hemisphere 0.1040                                              
Table 3a.  Co-Movement of Prices with U.S.,           
1960-1997*
High Co-Movement Countries**
*The table shows the value VP, the standard error of the residual for the AR-2 
regression for the log of the real exchange rate.  In some cases, the sample 
differs from 1960-97.
**This group includes only countries with 1997 population above 500,000.Austria 0.0196                                             
Netherlands 0.0217                                             
Denmark 0.0219                                             
Belgium 0.0242                                             
Germany 0.0328                                             
France 0.0338                                             
Norway 0.0363                                             
Switzerland 0.0395                                             
Ireland 0.0397                                             
Morocco 0.0426                                             
Italy 0.0478                                             
Portugal 0.0480                                             
Sweden 0.0489                                             
Spain 0.0491                                             
Greece 0.0510                                             
Tunisia 0.0529                                             
Cyprus 0.0536                                             
Finland 0.0552                                             
United Kingdom 0.0616                                             
New Zealand 0.0678                                             
Industrial Countries
unweighted mean 0.0507                                             
Developing Countries, unweighted means
Africa 0.1403                                             
Asia 0.1103                                             
Europe 0.1152                                             
Middle East 0.1607                                             
Western Hemisphere 0.1350                                             
**This group includes only countries with 1997 population above 500,000.
Table 3b.  Co-Movement of Prices with Euro-12,       
1960-1997*
High Co-Movement Countries**
*The table shows the value VP, the standard error of the residual for the AR-
2 regression for the log of the real exchange rate.  For a member of the Euro-
12, the co-movement is in relation to the other 11 countries.  In some cases, 
the sample differs from 1960-97. Switzerland 0.0713                                             
Austria 0.0719                                             
Germany 0.0776                                             
New Zealand 0.0791                                             
Netherlands 0.0805                                             
Denmark 0.0810                                             
Belgium 0.0816                                             
Papua New Guinea 0.0827                                             
Thailand 0.0841                                             
Cyprus 0.0845                                             
Singapore 0.0866                                             
France 0.0883                                             
Norway 0.0883                                             
Morocco 0.0918                                             
United States 0.0924                                             
Australia 0.0940                                             
Panama 0.0944                                             
Malaysia 0.0947                                             
Tunisia 0.0960                                             
Puerto Rico 0.0961                                             
Industrial Countries
unweighted mean 0.0919                                             
Developing Countries, unweighted means
Africa 0.1647                                             
Asia 0.1237                                             
Europe 0.1307                                             
Middle East 0.1730                                             
Western Hemisphere 0.1465                                             
**This group includes only countries with 1997 population above 500,000.
Table 3c. Co-Movement of Prices with Japan,         
1960-1997*
High Co-Movement Countries**
*The table shows the value VP, the standard error of the residual for the AR-2 
regression for the log of the real exchange rate.  In some cases, the sample 
differs from 1960-97.Canada 0.0135                     
United Kingdom 0.0150                     
Australia 0.0175                     
Germany 0.0196                     
Netherlands 0.0197                     
France 0.0200                     
Colombia 0.0205                     
Puerto Rico 0.0216                     
Denmark 0.0217                     
Norway 0.0224                     
Italy 0.0230                     
Spain 0.0238                     
Honduras 0.0251                     
Belgium 0.0253                     
Sweden 0.0254                     
Switzerland 0.0256                     
Costa Rica 0.0258                     
Austria 0.0261                     
Japan 0.0265                     
Guatemala 0.0265                     
Industrial Countries
unweighted mean 0.0251                     
Developing Countries, unweighted means
Africa 0.0591                     
Asia 0.0524                     
Europe 0.0449                     
Middle East 0.0749                     
Western Hemisphere 0.0442                     
**This group includes only countries with 1997 population above 500,000.
Table 4a.  Co-Movement of Outputs with U.S.,         
1960-1997*
High Co-Movement Countries**
Note:  The table shows the value VY, the standard error of the residual for the 
AR-2 regression for the log of the ratio of real per capita GDPs.  In some 
cases, the sample differs from 1960-97.France 0.0094                      
Belgium 0.0108                      
Netherlands 0.0116                      
Austria 0.0131                      
Colombia 0.0145                      
Italy 0.0154                      
Germany 0.0154                      
Sweden 0.0165                      
Spain 0.0165                      
Switzerland 0.0168                      
United Kingdom 0.0170                      
Denmark 0.0177                      
United States 0.0185                      
Canada 0.0187                      
Japan 0.0202                      
Puerto Rico 0.0205                      
Norway 0.0210                      
Guatemala 0.0220                      
Australia 0.0222                      
Cyprus 0.0227                      
Industrial Countries
unweighted mean 0.0198                      
Developing Countries, unweighted means
Africa 0.0557                      
Asia 0.0500                      
Europe 0.0421                      
Middle East 0.0713                      
Western Hemisphere 0.0426                      
**This group includes only countries with 1997 population above 500,000.
Table 4b. Co-Movement of Outputs with Euro-12,      
1960-1997*
High Co-Movement Countries**
Note: The table shows the value VY, the standard error of the residual for the 
AR-2 regression for the log of the ratio of real per capita GDPs.  In some 
cases, the sample differs from 1960-97. For a member of the Euro-12, the co-
movement is in relation to the other 11 countries.France 0.0214                   
United Kingdom 0.0217                   
Germany 0.0229                   
Austria 0.0234                   
Netherlands 0.0235                   
Italy 0.0236                   
Belgium 0.0243                   
Colombia 0.0252                   
Australia 0.0254                   
Sweden 0.0256                   
Greece 0.0260                   
Switzerland 0.0262                   
Puerto Rico 0.0262                   
Denmark 0.0265                   
United States 0.0265                   
Sri Lanka 0.0271                   
Spain 0.0272                   
Thailand 0.0282                   
Cyprus 0.0286                   
Canada 0.0296                   
Industrial Countries
unweighted mean 0.0282                   
Developing Countries, unweighted means
Africa 0.0596                   
Asia 0.0541                   
Europe 0.0443                   
Middle East 0.0748                   
Western Hemisphere 0.0463                   
**This group includes only countries with 1997 population above 500,000.
Table 4c. Co-Movement of Outputs with Japan,        
1960-1997*
High Co-Movement Countries**
Note: The table shows the value VY, the standard error of the residual for the 
AR-2 regression for the log of the ratio of real per capita GDPs.  In some cases, 




















Nicaragua 1168 0.121 0.079 0.039 0.521 0.530 0.551 0.078 0.077 0.082
Bolivia 702 0.053 0.032 0.014 0.105 0.155 0.150 0.043 0.043 0.049
Peru 531 0.035 0.024 0.011 0.135 0.134 0.157 0.057 0.055 0.060
Argentina 431 0.009 0.017 0.003 0.255 0.230 0.251 0.060 0.056 0.062
Brazil 288 0.015 0.015 0.004 0.122 0.133 0.155 0.042 0.035 0.041
Chile 107 0.047 0.051 0.021 0.116 0.139 0.140 0.050 0.052 0.058
Israel 78 0.052 0.069 0.007 0.092 0.099 0.124 0.038 0.032 0.039
Uruguay 62 0.014 0.027 0.002 0.158 0.154 0.174 0.038 0.038 0.043
Congo, Dem. Rep. 49 0.033 0.170 0.010 0.170 0.163 0.179 0.054 0.052 0.057
Mexico 41 0.087 0.013 0.006 0.111 0.160 0.165 0.036 0.036 0.036
Turkey 39 0.011 0.046 0.003 0.116 0.113 0.138 0.036 0.038 0.042
Ghana 39 0.056 0.108 0.024 0.231 0.248 0.253 0.047 0.042 0.048
Sierra Leone 34 0.049 0.123 0.025 0.207 0.254 0.249 0.058 0.050 0.056
Guinea-Bissau 30 0.014 0.275 0.018 0.156 0.142 0.174 0.063 0.063 0.062
Ecuador 25 0.099 0.043 0.017 0.072 0.114 0.113 0.042 0.040 0.041
Colombia 23 0.045 0.027 0.006 0.071 0.098 0.116 0.020 0.014 0.025
Guyana 22 0.230 0.094 0.035 0.117 0.155 0.151 0.058 0.058 0.062
Costa Rica 20 0.113 0.049 0.013 0.109 0.110 0.141 0.026 0.029 0.040
Venezuela, RB 18 0.117 0.040 0.010 0.112 0.144 0.147 0.044 0.040 0.043
Paraguay 18 0.024 0.034 0.008 0.109 0.119 0.125 0.037 0.034 0.040
Nigeria 18 0.150 0.228 0.025 0.160 0.195 0.213 0.082 0.070 0.079
Jamaica 17 0.194 0.031 0.011 0.113 0.135 0.145 0.050 0.046 0.044
Portugal 16 0.011 0.077 0.003 0.083 0.048 0.096 0.035 0.028 0.030
Iran, Islamic Rep. 16 0.031 0.123 0.054 0.479 0.467 0.497 0.073 0.066 0.069
Oman 16 0.036 0.177 0.160 0.125 0.145 0.162 0.120 0.118 0.112
Greece 16 0.008 0.061 0.006 0.075 0.051 0.097 0.029 0.024 0.026
Dominican Republic 15 0.168 0.031 0.011 0.096 0.114 0.134 0.057 0.053 0.056
Indonesia 15 0.040 0.028 0.078 0.122 0.148 0.151 0.031 0.030 0.033
Table 5.  High-Inflation Countries.*  Trade Ratios and Co-Movements with U.S., Euro-12, and Japan
*Only countries with population above 500,000 are considered.  For euro-12 members, co-movements are computed in relation to the other 11 countries.  High-inflation countries with 




Nicaragua 1168.4 US US Euro
Bolivia 702.4 US US US
Peru 530.7 US Euro Euro
Argentina 430.8 Euro Euro Euro
Brazil 288.4 US US Euro
Chile 106.9 Euro US US
Israel 78.2 Euro US Euro
Uruguay 62.2 Euro Euro US/Euro
Congo, Dem. Rep. 48.7 Euro Euro Euro
Mexico 41.0 US US Euro/Japan
Turkey 39.4 Euro Euro US
Ghana 38.7 Euro US Euro
Sierra Leone 34.2 Euro US Euro
Guinea-Bissau 30.5 Euro Euro Japan
Ecuador 25.0 US US Euro
Colombia 22.7 US US Euro
Guyana 22.3 US US Euro
Costa Rica 20.0 US US US
Venezuela 18.5 US US Euro
Paraguay 17.8 Euro US Euro
Nigeria 17.5 Euro US Euro
Jamaica 16.6 US US Japan
Portugal 16.2 Euro Euro Euro
Iran 16.1 Euro Euro Euro
Oman 16.0 Euro US Japan
Greece 15.6 Euro Euro Euro
Dominican Republic 15.1 US US Euro
Indonesia 15.0 Japan US Euro
Table 6.  High-Inflation Countries                                       
Best Anchor Based on the Three Criteria
Note:  The table excludes countries with 1997 population below 500,000 and countries for 
which VP or VY are not available.  Bold values apply if  1) highest trade share less second 
highest trade exceeds 0.04; 2) magnitude of difference between lowest VP and next lowest 
VP exceeds 0.025; or 3) magnitude of difference between lowest VY and next lowest VY 
exceeds 0.005.Country Trade* VP** VY**
Algeria Euro Euro Euro
Austria Euro Euro Euro
Belgium-Lux*** Euro Euro Euro
Benin Euro Euro Euro
Cameroon Euro Euro US
Canada US US US
Central African Republic Euro Euro Euro
Chad Euro Euro Euro
Congo, Dem. Rep. Euro Euro Euro
Congo, Rep. Euro Euro Euro
Costa Rica US US US
Cote d'Ivoire Euro Euro Japan
Cyprus Euro Euro Euro
Dominican Republic US US Euro
Ecuador US US Euro
Gabon Euro Euro Euro
Gambia, The Euro US Euro
Ghana Euro US Euro
Guinea-Bissau Euro Euro Japan
Guyana US/Euro US Euro
Haiti US US Euro
Honduras US US US
Hong Kong, China US US Euro
Iran, Islamic Rep. Euro Euro Euro
Ireland Euro Euro Euro
Jamaica US US Japan
Jordan Euro US Euro
Kenya Euro Euro US/Euro
Madagascar Euro Euro Euro
Malaysia Japan US Euro
Mauritania Euro Euro Euro
Mauritius Euro Euro US
Morocco Euro Euro Euro
Netherlands Euro Euro Euro
Table 7.  High Trade-Share Countries                               
Best Anchor Based on the Three CriteriaCountry Trade* VP** VY**
Nicaragua US US Euro
Niger Euro Euro Euro
Nigeria Euro/US US Euro
Oman Euro/Japan US Japan
Panama Japan/US US Euro
Papua New Guinea Japan US Japan
Romania Euro US Euro
Saudi Arabia Euro US US/Euro
Senegal Euro Euro Euro
Sierra Leone Euro US Euro
Singapore US/Japan US Euro
Sweden Euro Euro Euro
Switzerland Euro Euro Euro
Syrian Arab Republic Euro US Euro
Togo Euro Euro Euro
Trinidad and Tobago US US Euro
Tunisia Euro Euro Euro
United Arab Emirates Japan/Euro US Euro
Venezuela, RB US US Euro
*The table excludes countries with 1997 population below 500,000 and countries for 
which VP or VY are not available.  The best anchor according to the trade criterion is 
shown only when the trade share exceeds 9%.  When there is more than one anchor 
country for which the trade share exceeds 9%, we list the anchors in descending order 
of the trade shares.
**Bold values apply if  the magnitude of the difference between the lowest VP and the 
next lowest VP exceeds 0.025 or the magnitude of the difference between the lowest 
VY and the next lowest VY exceeds 0.005.
Table 7 (continued).  High Trade-Share Countries                      
Best Anchor Based on the Three CriteriaAuthors Significance
 Point estimate of 
increased trade from 
currency union
Rose (2000) s around 240%
Frankel and Rose (2002) s around 290%
Engel and Rose (2002) s around 240%
Persson (2001) ns around 40%
Tenreyro (2001) ns around 60%
Pakko and Wall (2001) ns around -55%
Glick and Rose (2001) s around 100%
Rose and van Wincoop (2001) s around 140%
Rose (2001) ns, s -68%-708%
Lopez-C. and Meissner (2001) s around 100%
Levy Y. (2001) s around 50%
Nitsch (2002) s around 85%
Flandreau and Maurel (2001) s around 220%
Klein (2002) s around 50%
Note: s=statistically significantly different from zero, ns=not significant.
Table 8                                                    





min (log of per capita GDP in pair ) -0.1586 * 0.061 -0.0015
max (log of per capita GDP in pair ) 1.7167 * 0.385 0.0163
min (log of population in pair ) -0.1352 * 0.048 -0.0013
max (log of population in pair ) 0.2372 0.127 0.0023
min (log of area in pair ) -0.0546 0.046 -0.0005
max (log of area in pair ) 0.2181 * 0.072 0.0021
regional trade agreement dummy -0.8864 * 0.277 -0.0032
log of distance (km) -0.8766 * 0.143 -0.0083
border contiguity dummy -1.2398 * 0.619 -0.0033
landlocked client dummy -0.1522 0.242 -0.0013
one island in pair dummy 0.0226 0.240 0.0002
two islands in pair dummy 1.1880 * 0.437 0.0512
common language dummy 0.7487 * 0.216 0.0124
ex colony-colonizer dummy 1.8799 * 0.285 0.1369
current colony (or territory) dummy 0.8491 * 0.239 0.0253
Pseudo R-squared 0.473
Number of observations 29564
*statistically significant at 1% level. 
Dependent Variable: Currency Union Dummy
Notes: The sample consists of country pairs that include the four candidate anchors, Australia, France, U.K., 
and U.S.  The equations are for annual data from 1960 to 1997, include year effects, and allow for clustering 
over time for country pairs.  The definition of currency union treats the CFA franc countries as linked to France 
and treats the ECCA countries as linked to the U.S. since 1976 and to the U.K. before 1976.  The mean of the 
currency-union dummy for this sample is 0.051.  For the sample that regards the CFA countries as unlinked to 
France and the ECCA countries as unlinked to the U.S. or the U.K., the mean is 0.024.  The last column shows 
the marginal effect, evaluated at the sample mean, of each explanatory variable on the estimated probability of 
a currency union.  For dummy variables, the effect refers to a shift from zero to one.System OLS
OLS with country 
effects
IV
IV with country 
effects
0.75 0.91 1.56 2.70
(0.20) (0.18) (0.44) (0.44)
0.0690 0.0456 0.2433 0.0874
(0.0058) (0.0028) (0.0243) (0.0080)
0.0029 0.0000 0.0119 -0.0020
(0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0061) (0.0022)
The equations for co-movement include only one observation for each pair, corresponding to the period 1960-97.  The explanatory 
variables then refer to averages over time.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Notes:  The equations for bilateral trade use annual data from 1960 to 1997, include year effects, and allow for clustering of the error 
terms over time for country pairs.  The dependent variable is log(trade+100), where trade is measured in 1995 U.S. dollars.  The value 
100 is close to the maximum-likelood estimate of the constant in the expression log(trade+constant).  The explanatory variables included, 
aside from the currency-union dummy, are log(distance); dummy variables for contiguity, common language, colonial relationships, land-
locked, and island; and the values for each country in the pair of log(per capita GDP), log(population), and log(area).  The definition of 
currency union treats the CFA franc countries as linked to France and treats the ECCA countries as linked to the U.S. since 1976 and to 
the U.K. before 1976.  Country effects refer to each member of the pair (not to a country-pair).  The instrumental variable (IV) systems 
include as an instrument for the currency-union dummy the variable described in the text.  









































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of Countries (excl. Sub-Saharan Africa)
Number of Countries (incl. Sub-Saharan Africa)
Trade to GDP Ratio ( average of France, UK, Denmark,
Italy, Norway, Portugal, Australia, Brazil, Sweden)
Trade to GDP Ratio (average of 61 countries since 1950) 